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695 F.2d 78, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1982». 
By its decision in Whitehead, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has held that occupants of over-
night train sleeping compartments do not 
have the same expectation of privacy as 
individuals in their homes or hotel rooms. 
Additionally, the. court has stated that 
where such diminished expectation exists, 
the importance of the law enforcement 
interests at stake and the "minimal intru-
siveness" of the search abrogate the 
requirement of probable cause under the 
fourth amendment. As a result of this rul-
ing, the court of appeals has not only rede-
fined the privacy interests of individuals 
travelling by train, but it appears to justify 
the abrogation of probable cause as a pre-
requisite to a canine sniff search for contra-
band by endorsing the use of police 
profiles to establish a reasonable, arti-
culable suspicion of criminal activity. 
- Virginia Manno Harasti 
Mills v. Maryland: SUPREME COURT 
RULES TIIA T MAR TIANO'S CAPI-
TAL SENTENCING PROCEDURE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MANDA-
TORY 
In Mills 'V. Maryland, _U.S.---O 108 S. 
Ct. 1860 (1988), the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a 5-4 decision, reversed a 
Maryland Court of Appeals death sentence 
affirmation on the ground that the jury 
verdict form used was unconstitutional. 
Ralph Mills, an inmate in the Maryland 
Correctional Institution, was convicted by 
a jury of the first degree murder of his 
cellmate, Paul Brown. At the conclusion 
of the sentencing hearings, the same jury, 
using the verdict form provided for in Md. 
Rule Proc. 772A, found beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that an aggravating circumstance 
had been proven; namely, that the "defen-
dant committed the murder at a time 
when he was confined in a correctional 
institution." Id. at 1871. Equally impor-
tant, the jury found none of the mitigating 
circumstances provided for in Rule 772A 
had been proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Consequently, the jury had 
marked "no" beside each of the eight 
mitigating circumstances listed on the ver-
dict form. Accordingly, as required by the 
Maryland Capital Punishment Statute, 
Md. Ann. Code, art. 27 § 413 (1987 Repl. 
Vol.), the jury handed down a sentence of 
death. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, petitioner argued that the sta-
tute, in conjuction with the jury instruc-
tions and the verdict form, was 
unconstitutional in that jury unanimity 
was required to find the presence or 
absence of an aggravating circumstance, 
but not required to find the absence of any 
mitigating circumstances. Therefore, a sen-
tence of death could result in a situation 
where the jury unanimously found an 
aggravating circumstance, but could not 
agree on the presence of anyone specific 
mitigating circumstance, even if all twelve 
agreed that some mitigating factors existed. 
Id. at 1865. Conversely, even if eleven of 
the jurors agreed to the existence of a par-
ticular mitigating circumstance, the failure 
of the remaining juror to agree to the same 
circumstance may result in the jury mark-
ing the verdict form "no" in regard to that 
particular circumstance. 
The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment, and concluded that the requirement 
of unanimity imposed by the statute 
applied not only to a finding of the exist-
ence of a particular mitigating cir-
cumstance, but also to a finding of the 
absence of any mitigating circumstance. 
The Court found that the verdict form 
should be read as requiring unanimity for 
"no" answers as well as "yes" answers. 
Furthermore, they found that the trial 
judge's instructions to the jury stressed the 
need for unanimity on all of the issues pre-
sented. Id. at 1864. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that a finding by anyone juror 
of a mitigating circumstance was sufficient 
to compel the jury to weigh this factor 







One sentence inserted by 
your attorney-
"I give and bequeath to the 
American Lung Assocla· 
tlon of Maryland the sum 
of dollars to be 
used for Its genaral 
purposes." 
-can help prevent and care for 
lung diseases that cripple and 
kill adults and children. 
t AMERICAN WNG • ASSOCIATION of Mary/and, Inc. 
ISOI York Road. LUlhenilir. MD 210911. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cognized, however, that the statute did not 
provide a procedure to be followed when 
unanimity could not be reached. Thus, 
pursuant to its authority to fill gaps in the 
sentencing process, as provided by § 
413(1), they directed that if the jury could 
not agree unanimously on the acceptance 
or rejection of any mitigating cir-
cumstances, it should leave that answer 
blank and proceed to the balancing phase. 
Id. at 1864. 
The Supreme Court initially noted the 
importance of mitigating factors in capital 
cases, stating that "the sentencer may not 
refuse to consider or be precluded from 
considering any relevant evidence." 
Eddings 'V. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
With this proposistion in mind, the Court 
proceeded to analyze "whether petition-
er's interpretation of the sentencing pro-
cess is one a reasonable jury could have 
drawn from the instructions given by the 
trial judge and from the verdict form 
employed in this case." Mills at 1866. 
The strength of Mill's argument rested 
on the possibility that alternate grounds 
existed for the sentence of death. If the 
jury adopted the interpretation favored by 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, then it 
only marked "no" on the verdict form 
when all twelve of the jurors agreed that 
the mitigating circumstances were not pro-
ved by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. Conversely, if the jury adopted the 
approach advanced by the petitioner, then 
the marking of "no", only indicated a fail-
ure to unanimOUsly agree to the existence 
of a particular mitigating circumstance. 
Thus, the jury would be precluded from 
considering mitigating factors that some 
jurors found to exist. The Supreme Court 
said, "[U]nless we can rule out the substan-
tial possibility that the jury may have 
rested its verdict on the 'improper' 
ground, we must remand for resentenc-
ing." Id. at 1867. 
They decided that the two crucial fac-
tors to be considered were the judge's 
instructions to the jury regarding the ver-
dict form stipulated by Md. Rule Proc. 
772A, and the verdict form itself. Regard-
ing the jury instructions, the Court found 
that while the trial judge repeatedly stress-
ed the need for unanimity concerning the 
finding of both aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, he failed to stress that the 
answer of "no" to either one also required 
a unanimous fmding. Thus, the Court 
determined that it was possible that the 
jury made the inference that the "no" 
answer is merely a failure to unanimously 
agree on the existence of a particular cir-
cumstance, either aggravating or 
mitigating, not a unanimous finding that 
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circumstances were not proven. Addition-
ally, there was nothing in the trial judge's 
instruction to indicate that the jury had 
the third option advanced by the court of 
appeals; namely, to leave the answer blank 
when a unanimous finding of either "yes" 
or "no" could not be reached and then 
proceed to the balancing phase. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court concluded that it was 
possible that a jury following the trial 
judge's instructions could be precluded 
from considering possible relevant 
mitigating circumstances, "if even a single 
juror adhered to the view that such a fac-
tor should not be so considered." Id. at 
1868. 
Regarding the verdict from itself, the 
Supreme Court found persuasive the fact 
that subsequent to the decision below, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland had found 
it necessary to promulgate a new verdict 
form, which expressly made provisions for 
the jury to find that not all twelve jurors 
agree on the existence or nonexistence of a 
particular mitigating circumstance. This 
new form also expressly makes provisions 
for such findings to be included in the bal-
ancing portion of the sentencing. The 
Court also noted that in the two cases tried 
before juries which used the new verdict 
form, both juries reported non-unanimous 
votes. 
Consequently, the Court found 
that there is a substantial possibility 
that reasonable jurors, upon receiving 
the judge's instructions in this case, 
and in attempting to complete the ver-
dict form as instructed, well may have 
thought they were precluded from 
considering any mitigating evidence 
unless all twelve jurors agreed on the 
existence of a particular such cir-
cumstance. 
Id. at 1870. 
The Court therefore determined that the 
death sentence, which was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, must be 
vacated and the case remanded for 
resentencing. 
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
and Kennedy, concluded that the charges 
of the trial judge to the jury were reasona-
bly sufficient to emphasize the need for 
unanimity on all the issues involved, 
including the existence or nonexistence of 
mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, 
the dissent noted that the reworking of the 
verdict form was not evidence that the 
form itself was improper, since "a sentenc-
ing instruction that is constitutionally 
acceptable may be improved in any 
number of ways." Id. at 1874 n.2. 
A sentence of death places a heavy bur-
den on the court system to regulate the 
procedure by which it may be imposed. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in 
Mins illustrates not only the careful scruti-
ny that the imposistion of such sentence 
demands, but also the controversial ques-
tions that face the courts when protecting 
the constitutional rights of a person accus-
ed of a capital offense. 
-Gregory]. Swain 
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin: 
NO-MERIT BRIEF PROVIDED TO 
TIlE COURT BY COURT 
APPOINTED APPELlATE 
COUNSEL DOES NOT VIOLATE 
INDIGENT'S SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wiscon· 
sin, _U.S.-o 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
Wisconsin's no-merit brief rule, by which 
court-appointed counsel must prepare for 
the court a statement of why particular 
cases, statutes, or facts in the record lead 
him to believe his client's appeal is without 
merit, is consitutional under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In so holding, 
the Court indicates that counsel's role as 
an officer of the court is at least as impor-
tant, if not more important, than his role 
as an advocate and essentially places the 
attorney in the position of decision-maker. 
A Wisconsin trial judge found the appel-
lant, an indigent, guilty of abduction and 
sexual assault and sentenced him to twelve 
years in prison. Appellant then filed an 
appeal and the court appointed a lawyer to 
represent him. The attorney, after review-
ing the case, advised appellant that an 
appeal would be useless. Rule 809.32(1) of 
the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure provides: 
H [a court-appointed attorney] is of the 
opinion that further appellate proceed-
ings on behalf of the defendant would 
be frivolous and without any arguable 
merit within the meaning of A nders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the 
attorney shall file with the court of 
appeals 3 copies of a brief in which is 
stated anything in the record that 
might arguably support the appeal and 
a discussion of why the issue lacks merit. 
(Emphasis added). 
Counsel partially complied with the rule 
by submitting arguments in support of the 
appeal, stating his belief that the argu-
ments were without merit, and asking for 
permission to withdraw from the case. 
Counsel failed, however, to provide the 
court with a discussion of why he believed 
those arguments were without merit, 
claiming such action would contravene 
Anders and violate the appellant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. McCay at 
1898. Since the brief did not fully comply 
with Rule 809.32(1), the court ordered it 
stricken and told the attorney to submit a 
conforming brief. Instead, counsel sought 
a declaratory judgment in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, asking the court to 
declare unconstitutional that portion of 
the rule which requires the attorney to dis-
cuss why the issue lacks merit. Id. at 1899. 
In upholding the rule, the Wisconsin court 
and the Supreme Court both relied on and 
expanded upon Anders. 
The petitioner in Anders was convicted 
of the felony of possession of marijuana. 
Counsel was appointed to represent him 
on appeal; however, after reviewing the 
record, the attorney advised his client and 
the court that the appeal was without 
merit. After petitioner's request for a new 
attorney was denied, he proceeded to rep-
resent himself on appeal, but his convic-
tion was affirmed. Six years later, 
petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in 
the Supreme Court of California, asking 
the courts to reopen his case because he 
had been denied the right to counsel on his 
appeal. Both petitions were denied. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held 
that California's procedure, by which 
court-appointed counsel can withdraw 
from an appeal merely by furnishing the 
court with a letter in which counsel states 
that the appeal lacks merit, "does not com-
port with fair procedure and lacks that 
equality that is required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Anders at 741. Although 
the no-merit letter alerts the court of 
potentially frivolous litigation, it gives no 
basis for counsel's conclusion and fails to 
notify appellant of potential arguments in 
support of reversal. 
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